sequence of transfinite ordinals, each of which is not smaller 5 than the ordinal corresponding to the corresponding member of Goodstein's sequence of natural numbers,
G(m).
The standard interpretation of this argument is, first, that G(m) must, therefore, converge (Goodstein' Gödel's Theorem on formally unprovable, but interpretatively true, sentences of any formal system of Peano Arithmetic.
However, we note, first, that Gödel's reasoning can be carried out in a weak Arithmetic such as Robinson's system Q [Ro50] , which does not admit mathematical induction. The truth of the unprovable Gödel sentence could, thus, be reasonably argued as being even more intuitive than the truth, under the standard interpretation, of any number-theoretic assertion of Peano Arithmetic that necessarily appeals to mathematical induction.
Moreover, both truths are, classically, accepted as constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable.
We note, further, that Goodstein's Theorem involves a non-constructive -hence, nonverifiable -concept of mathematical truth 6 that is, prima facie, of a higher order of intuition, in a manner of speaking, than that required to see that Gödel's formally 5 In the sense in which this relation is defined in Cantor Arithmetic. 6 Necessarily so, according to a reasonable interpretation of the Kirby-Paris Theorem [KB82].
unprovable sentence is a true number-theoretic assertion of Peano Arithmetic under its standard interpretation [Go31a] . 7 If, therefore, the proof of Goodstein's Theorem is to be considered as having established, both, an unprovable proposition of Peano Arithmetic that is true under its standard interpretation, and a more natural independence phenomenon than Gödel's, then, such truth, too, must, reasonably, be a consequence of some constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, interpretation of Goodstein's reasoning.
In §8 we argue that such an interpretation does, indeed, exist -as an implicit thesis -in
Goodstein's argument. In §9 and §10 we, consequently, construct, and consider, a
Goodstein functional sequence that highlights why the standard interpretations of this argument ought not to be considered as definitive, and why we must consider the possibility that Goodstein's argument validly constructs a non-terminating sequence of decreasing ordinals which is not definable in ZFC. 9 We note that m and m <b> denote, but are different syntactical expressions of, the same natural number.
Notation and Definitions
followed by expression of each of the exponents as a sum of powers of b, etc., until the process stops.
The rank of a hereditary representation:
The rank of a hereditary representation is the highest power of the natural number base that has a non-zero co-efficient in the representation. 
which we express in an abbreviated form as: 
The Goodstein operations
We note that each natural number m has a unique hereditary representation, of some finite rank l, in any given natural number base b. Without loss of generality, we may express this syntactically as:
(c) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ l, the exponent i, too, is expressed syntactically by its hereditary representation, i <b> , in the base b; so, also, are all of its exponents, and, in turn, all of their exponents, etc.
Partial Goodstein operation
We define the partial Goodstein 11 Strictly speaking, this is a syntactical equivalence. 12 We prefer to define these concepts as "operations", rather than as "functions", simply to avoid any implicit commitment to possible set-theoretic properties.
We can express this, also without loss of generality, as:
which is the same as: 
Complete Goodstein operation
We, then, define the result of a complete 
Goodstein's argument
In his 1944 paper, Goodstein, essentially, considers, for any given natural number m, the sequence, G(m), of natural numbers of Peano Arithmetic: 
Goodstein's Theorem
Now, assuming that a set theory, such as ZFC, can be treated as a consistent extension of We note that this interpretation of Goodstein's argument is supported by the following examples.
Example
(1 2 '' -1) 3 = 0.3 0 ;
Hence G(1) is {1, 0}.
Hence G(2) is {2, 2, 1, 0}.
Example: m = 3
3 2 = 1.2 1 + 1.2 0 ;
Hence G(3) is {3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 0}. interpretations cannot be considered definitive.
Some Goodstein sequence lemmas
In order to highlight the significance of the above distinction, we introduce some general properties of sequences generated by iterated application of the complete Goodstein operation on the hereditary representation of the natural number m in a natural number base b.
The first Goodstein sequence lemma
We note, firstly, that, if:
where:
(c) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ l, the exponent i, too, is expressed syntactically by its hereditary representation, i <2> , in the base 2; so, also, are all of its exponents, and, in turn, all of their exponents, etc. then:
and, so:
. Now, if m > 3, then l ≥ 2. Hence:
It follows that:
Lemma 1: If there exists a natural number n such that the n th term, G(n, m), of the Goodstein sequence, G(m), is 0, then, for all m > 3, there is some k < n such that
The second Goodstein sequence lemma
Next, since the base of the k'th term of a Goodstein sequence is (k+1), we have that:
(c) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ l, the exponent i, too, is expressed syntactically by its hereditary representation, i <k+1> , in the base (k+1); so, also, are all of its exponents, and, in turn, all of their exponents, etc.
If, now, 0 ≤ j < l, and a j ≠ 0, then:
We, thus, have that:
It follows that: 
The third Goodstein sequence lemma
We consider, then, the case:
where 1 < a l < (k+1), and a i = 0 for 0 ≤ i < l.
Since all the terms in the above summation, except the first, are 0, we have that:
The fourth Goodstein sequence lemma
We consider, now, the case:
where a l = 1, (k+1) ≤ l, and a i = 0 for 0 ≤ i < l.
Since l'' > l, we have that:
The fifth Goodstein sequence lemma
We consider, next, the case:
where a l = 1, (k+1) > l, and a i = 0 for 0 ≤ i < l.
Since, now, l'' = l, we have that: It follows that, for some natural number n 1 > 1, we must have either n = (2n 1 +1), or n = 
The seventh Goodstein sequence lemma
Arguing as before, we now have that:
If n 1 > 2, the hereditary representation of G((n 1 -1), m) in the base n 1 is 1. 
r+1)
1 +(r-1).(n 1 -r+1) 0 .
We thus have that (n 1 -1) too, must be even, and, if (n 1 -1) = 2n 2 , then:
If n 2 > 3, the hereditary representation of G((n 2 -1), m) in the base n 2 is 2.n 2 1 +0.n 2 0 .
We thus have: 
Three Goodstein sequence theorems
It follows from the above lemmas that:
First Goodstein sequence theorem

16
: If the n th term, G(n, m), of the Goodstein sequence, G(m), is 0, then n = 2(2n 2 +1) for some natural number n 2 , and:
16 The characteristic structure of all terminating Goodstein sequences, expressed by this theorem, is investigated interestingly by R.E.S. [Re03] , and visualised intriguingly in a striking computer-generated 
where c l = (a l -1), and 0 < c i < (k+1) over 0 ≤ i < l;
(ii) or, yields, if a l = 1, a number of reduced rank, such as:
where 0 < c i < (k+1) over 0 ≤ i < (l-1).
In either case, it can be shown, inductively, that iterated application of the complete Goodstein operation must eventually reduce the rank of some member of the sequence to 0. By lemma 3, the sequence must, therefore, terminate with 0.
It follows that:
Lemma 8: For any natural number k, the sequence, L(k), defined as:
is a finite sequence that terminates with 0.
Third Goodstein sequence theorem: For any given natural number m, the Goodstein sequence, G(m), of natural numbers:
converges finitely if, and only if, there is some natural number k such that the sequence L(k) of finite natural numbers: '-1) (k+2) ''-1, . ..}, generated by the iterated application of the complete Goodstein operation on the hereditary representation of k k in the base k, is such that, for any n such that G(n, m)
, and L(k) converges finitely.
Proof:
We note, firstly, that, if there is a convergent sequence L(k) as defined above, then G(m) is a finitely bounded sequence and so, by the preceding lemmas, it must converge to 0.
Secondly, if G(m) converges finitely in n terms, and the largest member of the sequence is p, we can take k = max(n, p). By lemma 8, L(2q, k) = 0 for some q.
Since, by the first Goodstein sequence theorem, the largest term in L(k) is L(q, k) = q, and we also have that q > k k , it follows that q > n. Hence, for any n such that G(n,
Goodstein's implicit Thesis
We can now express Goodstein's argument constructively in Peano Arithmetic as:
The Goodstein Thesis: For any given natural numbers m and k, and partial sequences {G(n, m): 1≤ n ≤ k}, i.e.:
and {R(n, G(n, m) (n+1)|u(k) ): 1≤ n ≤ k}, defined as.:
where: we have that:
Now, by the first Goodstein sequence theorem, there is no natural number base u(k) for which we have that:
Thus Goodstein's argument appeals to properties of sequences of transfinite ordinals in Cantor Arithmetic that do not correspond to any arithmetical properties of their corresponding sequences of natural numbers in Peano Arithmetic.
It follows we cannot, prima facie, conclude that, by simply replacing a constructive natural number base, u(k), by the non-constructive ordinal base, ω, Goodstein's argument establishes Goodstein's Theorem as a true assertion of Peano Arithmetic, under its standard interpretation, in a constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, way.
Such a conclusion must, therefore, implicitly appeal to some non-constructive, and counter-intuitive, assumption that needs to be expressed explicitly.
A Goodstein functional sequence
The above point is illustrated better if we define the sequence of functions, {R(n, Hence, for all natural numbers n ≥ 1, u > 2:
N{m n (u)} is a finite, decreasing, sequence of natural numbers. Now, if the Goodstein sequence for m, i.e., G(m), terminates after l terms, then, clearly:
However, if G(m) does not terminate, then, for any u > 2, there can be no decreasing, sequence of natural numbers, N{m n (u)}, such that:
Nevertheless, in either case, treating [m n (x)] as a function over the ordinals, there is always a decreasing sequence of transfinite ordinals, W{[m n (ω)]}, such that:
where [G(n, m)] is the ordinal corresponding to the natural number G(n, m). 
Formal mathematical objects
Definition 1(iii):
A mathematical object is any symbol that is either a primitive mathematical object, or a formal mathematical object.
Definition 1(iv):
A set is the range of any function whose function letter is a formal mathematical object. 20 We take Mendelson' Nevertheless, we note that, in Anand [An02b] , we consider the existence of a primitive recursive number-theoretic relation that is intuitively decidable constructively, but which cannot be introduced through definition as a formal mathematical object into any formal system of Peano Arithmetic, PA, without inviting inconsistency. Ipso facto, such a relation cannot be introduced through definition as a formal mathematical object into any Axiomatic Set Theory, such as ZFC, in which the axioms of PA interpret as theorems.
Hence, it is not a formal mathematical object, and the range of its characteristic function is not a recursively enumerable set.
Since recursive number-theoretic functions and relations are classically accepted as amongst the most basic building blocks for defining constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, mathematical objects, we cannot, prima facie, accept Goodstein's argument as sufficient for establishing the recursively defined, and admittedly nonconstructive, ordinal sequence, {W[n, G(n, m) n|ω ]}, as a formal mathematical object in Cantor Arithmetic.
Conclusion
Goodstein's argument implicitly assumes that the recursively defined ordinal sequence, {W[n, m (n+1)|ω ]}, is a formal mathematical object in Cantor Arithmetic. In other words, it implicitly assumes the existence of a well-defined set of transfinite ordinals, in Cantor
Arithmetic, which has properties corresponding to the properties required of the numbertheoretic sequence L(k) that is defined in the third Goodstein sequence theorem above.
Since, as argued in Anand [An02b] , such an assumption need not necessarily hold, Goodstein's Theorem can, reasonably, be viewed as a number-theoretic proposition whose truth in the standard interpretation of any formal system of Peano Arithmetic has simply been asserted as a non-verifiable consequence of a non-constructive argument.
We conclude that, in the absence of a constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, proof, or meta-proof, that any given Goodstein sequence is bounded in Peano Arithmetic, the standard interpretation of Goodstein's Theorem as a number-theoretic assertion that is consistent with any formal system of Peano Arithmetic, such as standard PA, ought not to be accepted as definitive.
